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Abstract 
This paper measures the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the education mismatch 
of workers in Germany. State-level unemployment rates from 1994-2012 are used as a 
measure of economic conditions and mismatch is quantified in terms of overeducation by 
both industry and occupation.  Unfavorable economic conditions at the time of 
graduation significantly increase the probability that workers are overeducated in future 
jobs. IV estimates which account for potential endogeneity in graduation timing show 
that a single percentage point increase in state-level unemployment causes an increase in 
the probability of overeducation between 1.5 and 1.8% for university graduates.  Impacts 
for graduates of more technical tertiary education programs and apprenticeships are much 
smaller.  Labour market entry conditions appear to affect workers up to 18 years after 
graduation. 
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1 Introduction 
Research has identified an important incidence of mismatch between the educational 
levels of workers and the educational requirements of jobs.  This imbalance of education 
occurs in many labour markets, including several European countries (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 2011; McGuinness, 2006, Rubb, 2003; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 
2000).  The education match is important for both workers and firms.  If workers are 
sorted into suitable jobs, they are able to realise the best return to their human capital 
investments.  Likewise their employers are able to realise high productivity.   Thus 
educational mismatch has become an important policy issue. 
Freeman (1976) proposed that overeducation is caused by an oversupply of highly 
educated workers who are employed in jobs where they underutilise their educational 
skills. An implication underutilisation of skills is that the workers suffer sizeable wage 
penalties compared to well-matched workers. Given that education financing represents 
13% of public spending among OECD countries, 10.5% in Germany (OECD, 2012), 
overeducation mismatch implies underutilisation of an important resource; hence it is an 
important policy issue.1  
Despite the importance of this issue, the reasons for this high incidence of educational 
mismatch are not well understood. Although Malamud (2011) and Tsang and Levin 
(1985) posit that mismatch is due to persistent informational asymmetries, early studies 
such as Thurow (1975) maintain that institutional structures like internal labour markets 
are the causes of the observed high levels of educational mismatch.  One ongoing 
challenge for researchers in this area is explaining the continuing presence of 
overeducation, despite stable or increasing rates of return to education.  Explanations for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Other dimensions of mismatch may also be interesting including mismatches across 
college major or other definitions of skill (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Robst, 2007), 
however this analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper.  Furthermore, this paper 
does not address undereducation because it may not truly represent a mismatch 
(Sicherman, 1991). 
 
 
3 
overeducation in the literature include the compensating advantages to employees of 
lower stress levels, or increased productivity and reduced training costs realised by 
employers. Other reasons cited in the literature include the possibility that workers are 
matched on other dimensions such as experience (Sicherman 1991), literacy or specific 
components of skill (Boothby 2002, Sohn 2010). Yet, in such circumstances the 
mismatch may be temporary because workers overeducated for these reasons should be 
expected to be promoted faster relative to their less educated counterparts.  
Recent findings suggest that unobserved factors including worker ability may be one 
important contributor to these wage differentials (See Iriondo and Pérez-Amal (2013) for 
the EU and Tsai (2010) for the US).  One prevailing view in the literature is that 
overeducated individuals are overeducated simply because they are of low ability relative 
to their counterparts with similar qualifications. Thus, one should expect their pay to be 
adversely affected so as to be in line with their unobserved lower ability  
A second view is that the incidence of overeducation may be higher among workers who 
are hired in slack labor markets when jobs are hard to find. Search theory suggests that 
mismatch between workers and jobs increases in a recession (Albrecht and Vroman, 
2002; Charlot et al., 2005; Moscarini, 2001;  Wong, 2003).  Job matches formed in a 
downturn tend to be of lower quality (Barlevy 2002, Bowlus 1995, Mustre-del-Río, 
2014).  Individuals who graduate or enter the labour market when conditions are adverse 
experience large and persistent negative effects on careers (Bowlus and Liu (2003), Kahn 
(2010) and Oyer (2006) (US), Oreopoulos et al. (2012) (Canada) Brunner and Kuhn 
(2014) (Austria), Kondo (2007); Genda et al. (2010) (Japan) and Stevens (2007) 
(Germany)). Burgess et al. (2003), Ellwood (1982), and Raaum and Røed (2006) find 
persistent effects of youth unemployment on the careers later in life. 
The quality of first job placement has been shown to be especially important. Liu et al. 
(2012) find that initially mismatched graduates (i.e., those who were mismatched to the 
wrong industry on the first job) are much more vulnerable to business cycle variations 
whereas the careers of graduates who are matched to the right industry are largely 
immune from the negative impact of graduating in recessions.  Labour market entry 
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during a recession may have consequences for workers in the long-term since human 
capital formation is concentrated earlier in the life-cycle, For these workers, industry 
mobility and job mobility are important mechanisms of recovery from initial losses. 
Understanding the mechanisms driving these persistent career losses is essential to the 
design of government employment programs aiming at the employability of young 
workers. Yet, limited research is devoted on the mechanisms driving the highly persistent 
career losses although the overall magnitude and heterogeneity of these persistent losses 
is studied in detail.  The reason is that one is difficult to explain the persistence in career 
losses arising from presumably short-lived labour market shocks. Hagedorn and 
Manovskii (2013) Frühwirth-Schnatter et al. (2012) and Summerfield (2014) provide 
evidence that idiosyncratic match quality is affected by the tightness of the labor market. 
Kwon, Milgrom, and Hwang (2010) find that those who graduate in recessions are 
promoted slower, even when proxies for productivity are controlled for.  Oreopoulos et 
al. (2012) find that the lower quality of the first job can explain the persistence of 
earnings losses, but only when combined with search frictions that intensify with age.   
This paper investigates the impact of state economic conditions at the time of the 
individual’s graduation on the probability of him or her suffering a subsequent bad job 
match.  Economic activity is reflected in the federal region-level unemployment rates and 
job match quality is reflected on probability that the worker is overeducated.  The data 
are from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1994-2012, and 
overeducation measures are constructed using a comparison of a worker’s years of 
education to the median years of education observed in their occupation or industry.   
OLS results indicate that a single percentage point increase in the state-level 
unemployment rate at the time of the individual’s graduation corresponds to an increase 
in the probability of his or her subsequent overeducation by about 1%.  Importantly, this 
finding is not restricted to the initial job.  Labor market entry conditions contribute to the 
individual’s probability of overeducation for as much as 18 years after graduation.  
Separating the effect by education type shows that the relationship is strongest for 
workers with university education.   For university graduates the correlation suggests a 
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rate of 1.6-1.7% for comparisons of actual and required education within occupation and 
industry, respectively.  Using an IV strategy similar to Kahn (2010), estimates of the 
causal effect show that OLS estimates are relatively unbiased in the German data.  A 1% 
increase in the state-level unemployment rate where and when a worker graduated 
university causes a 1.5-1.8% increase in the probability of overeducation.  
 
2 Data  
This paper uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 
1994-2012.  The GSOEP is a nationally representative dataset with a wealth of detail on 
worker and their job characteristics.  Using information on the timing and location of 
graduation as well as detailed histories of schooling spells, indicators to identify the 
labour markets into which workers graduate are constructed.  This initial labour market 
information is matched with the region -level unemployment rates for the civilian 
population (excluding entrepreneurs) provided by the German statistical agency 
Statistisches Bundesamt.2 The analysis is restricted to workers graduating since 1994 
because this is the extent of the availability of state-level unemployment rates.3  Some 
workers in the data graduate from more than one level of education.  In this case the 
graduation date of the highest level of education achieved at observation is used.4  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  The average worker observed in the data is 
age 39 with just under 12 years of education, 19 years of work experience and 10 years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We thank Michael Stops at IAB for assistance locating these data. 
3 Results were also tested by generating unemployment rates directly from the data since 
1990, when the GSOEP began to collect data on the former East Germany.   The findings 
are robust.  These results are not presented here. The reason is that the GSOEP may not 
be representative within some regions, which, in turn suggest that the generated 
unemployment rates may not be reliable. 
4 For example, and apprenticeship graduate would be linked to the graduation date of 
their apprenticeship program thereafter, until such time as they graduate university in 
which case they would be associated with the new graduation date.  However a university 
graduate who returns to study in an apprenticeship program would continue to be 
associated with their university graduation date. 
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tenure in the current job.  Very few workers, only about 2 percent of the sample, are 
observed in their first job.  This suggests that the findings in the paper speak to the long-
run career consequences of graduation during a period of economic contraction. 
The overeducation measures in this paper use information from the education distribution 
of employed workers in the sample to define the “required” or appropriate level of 
education.  These overeducation measures therefore reflect the current position of 
workers in the education distribution in relation the ‘required education’ within 
occupation or industry in the year of observation.  One benefit of these measures is that 
they implicitly account for time trends in various occupational assignments.  The relative 
nature of the measures ensures that the measured effects reflect the scarring effect of 
initial conditions of low economic activity relative to other workers who have not faced 
these conditions. 
Overeducation, or education mismatch, is measured in several ways in this study. The 
main results are based on two binary measures of overeducation.  These measures follow 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and are commonly used in the overeducation literature. 
Workers are assigned to the overeducated group if their years of education exceed the 
median years of education among workers in their occupation or industry by more than a 
standard deviation.5  The “required” level of education is calculated each year for each 
occupation. The median is measured within 4-digit ISCO occupation codes and 2-digit 
NACE industry codes in each year.  Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the distribution 
of groups with a positive number of observations by size. These figures suggest that the 
vast majority of imputed required education measures are based on large sample sizes. 
Groups with fewer than 10 observations are excluded because the required level of 
education generated from such small samples is unlikely to be representative.  Because 
industry is measured at the 2-digit level, almost all groups are large enough to establish a 
required education level.  Only 9 worker observations are excluded from the sample.  In 
the case of 4-digit occupations, the number is 76.  Excluding these observations should 
not be expected to affect the results. Appendix Table A2 shows that the share of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Measures using the mean instead of the median provided similar results.   
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overeducated workers for their occupation is not statistically different between the 
excluded and included groups. 
The prevalence of overeducated workers in the German labour force is demonstrated in 
Table 1.  Approximately 18% of German workers are overeducated according to the 
occupation measure, and just fewer than 9% according to the industry measure.  These 
shares are similar to those reported in Daly et al., (2000) and Bauer (2002).6  For both 
occupation, and industry, the difference of education between actual and required 
education in years is also measured with a continuous variable.  These alternative 
measures give a sense of the magnitude of overeducation and may help to capture any 
effects that do not meet the threshold set in the binary measure.  The average difference 
between the occupation median education and a worker’s own actual education is 0.15 
years, whereas for the industry measure it is almost half a year of education.  Finally, a 
composite measure of the above four measures is also generated by using factor analysis. 
The leading factor captures the largest dimension of common variation among these 
measures.  
This paper is concerned specifically with the effect that economic conditions at 
graduation have on the probability of someone been overeducated in subsequent 
employment. . To demonstrate the importance of this type of mismatch relative to other 
measures, a subjective measure of job match quality from the GSOEP is also included.  
This binary indicator is based on whether individuals “work in the occupation for which 
they are trained.”  It turns out that this measure does not exhibit the same behavior as the 
other overeducation measures used in this study, suggesting that the macroeconomy tends 
to affect vertical rather than horizontal mismatch, at least in the case of Germany. 
The data suggest that those who graduated during a recession are, on average, more likely 
to be overeducated.   Figure 1 plots the share of workers who are overeducated across 
select groups of the unemployment rate at the time and location of graduation using both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Bauer (2002) finds 12% of men and 11% of women are overeducated using measures 
based on the mean education of worker groups.  Daly et al. (2000) reports 14 of men and 
20% of women were overeducated in 1984 using a self-reported measure 
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the occupation-based and industry-based measures.  It is shown that for occupation the 
workers have an overeducation rate of approximately 12% if they entered the labour 
market during the most favorable times (when the state-level unemployment rate was 2-
3%).  The share of overeducated rises with the unemployment rates reaching 17% for 
those who graduated in labour markets with state-level unemployment rates above 12%.    
Similar results are found for the industry measure where overeducation rates range from 
about 15% to almost 19% respectively. 
 
3 Empirical Approach 
The empirical analysis is based on a parsimonious specification designed to capture the 
separate effects of initial labour market conditions from the effects of a worker’s human 
capital.  For each of our overeducation measures (OE) the baseline equation (1) is 
estimated using the linear probability model.7 
𝑂𝐸!"# = 𝛼 + 𝑋!"#! 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑈!"!! + 𝛿! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!"#           (1) 
The coefficient γ is the estimate of the relationship between regional-level unemployment 
rates in the region of gradation at the time of graduation (t-h) on the overeducation 
measure of worker i in period t graduating in region r.  Estimates are weighted using the 
enumeration weights provided in the GSOEP to give representative results for the 
German population.   
Because the source of identification varies at the regional level, the empirical model 
relies on region fixed-effects to capture the group structure of the standard errors.  
However, serial correlation within panels is still a concern (Bertrand et al. 2004).  
Therefore standard errors are clustered on the region of graduation. Unfortunately, it is 
also true that cluster-robust inference may lead to over rejection of the null in t-tests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The linear probability model is chosen over the probit or logit analysis because it 
permits more careful inference with wild-cluster robust inference.  Probit models were 
estimated and gave similar results. 
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when the number of clusters is low (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  In the case of Germany 
there are 16 federal regions (Bundeslands), which fall between the potential thresholds of 
42 suggested by Moulton (1986) and 10 suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008).8 The 
wild-cluster bootstrap of (Cameron et al. 2008) is therefore employed to provide robust 
inference for our variable of interest. 
The model also includes the covariate vector X.  This vector contains dummy variables 
for the highest completed education stream (university, other tertiary and apprenticeship), 
gender, marital status, and German nationality. These demographic variables are usually 
included in wage regressions in the empirical research, but they are expected to play a 
role in employment possibilities and therefore the probability of overeducation. 
Continuous controls for age and full-time work experience measured in years, as well as 
their quadratics are included. δ Are the region of graduation dummy variables and τ are 
year dummy variables.  Approximately 15% of the individuals in the sample have 
relocated since graduation to a different region.  A dummy variable that captures 
geographic mobility since graduation is also included to account for the possibility that 
geographic mobility contributes to the likelihood for someone to be overqualified.  This 
may be important when considering regional labour markets if those of higher ability, for 
example, are more likely to avoid overeducation by relocating to a neighbouring region. 
3.1 Identification  
Identifying the causal impact of region level unemployment rates requires that the 
exogeneity of unemployment rates.  Certainly, macroeconomic conditions at the regional 
level cannot be meaningfully influenced by the decisions of any one individual worker.  
However, endogeneity could be an issue because of graduation location or timing.  
Individuals may attempt to time their graduation so as to delay it until labour market 
conditions improve. This is especially true among university graduates since many degree 
programs do not have fixed timelines and tuition fees are relatively low.  Any bias might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It should be noted, however, that cluster-robust standard errors from popular statistics 
packages such as Stata might still behave well with less than 10 clusters. (Angrist and 
Pischke 2008 citing Hansen, 2007) 
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therefore be expected to be most significant for university graduates.  Scrupulous 
students may also choose to attend tertiary education or enroll in apprenticeship programs 
in regions where jobs are more prevalent.  This might be particularly true in 
apprenticeship programs where connections are made with future employers. 
The data suggest that some workers do delay their graduation.  Among graduates with 
university education, 25% of the sample graduate beyond age 29.  The equivalent 
statistics for tertiary education and apprenticeships are 23 and 21 years, respectively.  The 
modal graduation ages are 27 for university, 21 for other tertiary schooling and 20 for 
apprenticeships.  The share of workers who switch region since age 14 is low at only 1% 
of the sample.   Results addressing endogeneity with IV estimates are presented in 
Section 4.3.  However, these results suggest that endogeneity bias in the OLS estimates is 
negligible. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Baseline Specification 
Region level unemployment rates at the time of hire have positive and significant effects 
on the likelihood that a worker is overqualified.  Table 2 presents OLS estimates of 
equation (1) using various outcome measures.  The graduation date and location from the 
highest level of completed education is used in these results.  Estimates are presented 
with indicators for statistical significance from cluster-robust standard errors, and wild-
bootstrap p-values are included at the bottom of the table.  Only those results that are 
significant with both methods of inference are discussed. 
 Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of a downturn on the binary measures of 
overeducation within occupation and industry respectively.  One percentage point 
increase in the regional unemployment rate at labour market entry, leads to about a 1% 
increase in the likelihood of overeducation within a workers occupation.  Given that 18% 
of workers in the sample are overeducated, this is a significant result.  A recession which 
 
 
11 
increases region-level unemployment by 4 percentage points could be expected to 
increase the incidence of overqualified workers in the labour force by 25%. Columns 3 
and 4 examine the difference between actual education and required education from 
labour market entry conditions.  These linear measures provide insight about the level of 
overqualified workers as a result of macroeconomic conditions.  Column 4 shows that 
one percentage point increase in the region unemployment rate at labour market entry 
increases the amount by which actual education exceeds required education by about 0.6 
years.   
A composite measure, presented in column 5, confirms these results.  Because this 
measure is the result of factor analysis on the prior four measures, it has no cardinal 
interpretation.  However, the factor loading matrix in Appendix Table A1 shows that this 
measure is positively correlated with overeducation in the binary measures and with the 
extent by which actual education exceeds required education in the continuous measures.  
This measure should capture the common variation across the measures that is 
responsible for worker education exceeding educational requirements 
The sizes of the coefficients in this study are somewhat lower relative to earlier studies.  
For example, Liu et al. (2012) find that a three percentage point increase in 
unemployment rates leads to a 30% increase in mismatch.  However, the results are not 
directly comparable because Liu et al. (2012) measure mismatch by comparing a 
worker’s industry to their field of education.  Smaller effects in the current analysis are 
also to be expected because the incidence of mismatch is considered across a worker’s 
entire career, as observed in the data.  The findings are more similar to results from 
Canada.  Using a similar definition of overeducation, Summerfield (2014) finds that one 
percentage point increase in regional unemployment at the time of job creation leads to a 
3% increase in the probability of an individual being overeducated.  Larger effects in 
Canada are to be expected since labour market conditions at the creation of the current 
job might have a stronger effect relative to the permanent scarring effect of conditions at 
first entry.  
The results above demonstrate that overeducation, a measure of vertical mismatch, 
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responds to labour market entry conditions.  To investigate whether entry conditions also 
affect horizontal mismatch, a GSOEP measure of specific job match is also used.  
Whereas the overeducation measures may capture mismatch in general transferrable skill, 
this alternative measure may capture mismatch between training and occupation or 
mismatch across educational fields.  Estimates in column 6 indicate that labour market 
entry conditions do not affect the likelihood of a worker being employed in an occupation 
that they are trained for.  This result differs from Liu et al. (2012) who do find some 
evidence of horizontal mismatch between field of study and industry.  This result 
suggests that overeducation, or vertical mismatch, is the important relevant measure for 
cyclical mismatch in the labour market.9   
4.2 Education Types 
An alternative specification provides analysis of the graduation conditions effect 
separately by education stream, E. 
  𝑂𝐸!"# = 𝛼 + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽 + 𝑈!"!!  ×  (𝛾!"𝐸!"#!" + 𝛾!"𝐸!"#!" + 𝛾!"𝐸!"#!")+ 𝛿! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!"#           
(2) 
Unemployment rates at graduation are attributed separately to groups by education type.  
Three groups are generated to include university (UN), other tertiary (TE) and 
apprenticeship (AP) stream graduates.  As before, economic conditions at the time of 
graduation from the highest level of education are used when individuals have multiple 
graduation dates. .  This specification allows one to investigate whether initial labour 
market conditions affect certain types of graduates in a different way compared to others.  
Added flexibility by education type may be particularly important in the case of Germany 
because it has a well-developed apprenticeship system.  Technical and theoretical 
education may provide workers with more specific or more general human capital, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It should be noted that the GSOEP measure is subjective and therefore it may be noisier 
than the other measures used in this paper. Hence, this type of mismatch is not discussed 
further. 
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respectively.  If this is the case, economic conditions may have different effects on 
individuals who acquired different kinds of human capital.  For example, a university 
educated individual may be able to find a job for which she or he is overqualified if 
her/his general skills are productive in other fields of work, whereas an apprentice may 
be more likely to suffer unemployment if her/his skills are not transferrable to other, 
perhaps less suitable, jobs.  
A second set of models is estimated with education stream-specific entry conditions.  
These results illustrate how workers with various types of education are affected 
differently by entry conditions. Table 3 shows that the effects above are predominantly 
driven by the experience of university graduates.  The effect on university graduates 
using binary measures increase to 0.16 and 0.17 percent for occupation and industry 
respectively, and the industry measure turns now to be significant.  Additionally, column 
4 shows that the effect on the amount of increased education is almost a full additional 
year of schooling. These results are not surprising.  University education is expected to 
develop a more general form of human capital that is transferrable across jobs.  However, 
specific human capital that characterises apprenticeship and other tertiary education has 
been shown to vary at the industry (Neal 1995), and/or occupation level (Kambourov and 
Manovskii, 2009).  Although, there is some evidence that apprenticeship graduates may 
be affected by entry conditions, the estimated coefficients are relatively small. 
The vector of estimates β is informative regarding other factors contributing to 
overeducation, aside from the macroeconomic conditions.  University graduates in 
general appear more likely than those without any tertiary education to be overeducated, 
although this estimate is insignificant (first column in both Tables). The same is true for 
other tertiary education, which encompasses technical training such as teacher education 
and some medical fields.  In general, apprenticeship graduates are as likely to be 
overeducated as workers that have not completed any tertiary education.  Overeducation 
also increases with age following a quadratic path, and decreases with years of work 
experience.  The latter result implies that more experienced workers rely on their 
experience and on-the-job learning as a source of human capital rather than to formal 
education. The positive effect of age on overeducation may reflect the depreciation of 
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human capital.  With the advent and proliferation of computers and technology in the 
workplace, older workers may find themselves relegated to jobs which typically attract 
less-educated workers. 
4.3 IV Estimates and Endogeneity Bias  
Although individual workers cannot reasonably be expected to affect the macroeconomy, 
they may be able to control when and where they may graduate.  Therefore addressing 
the potential for endogeneity bias is critical for the credibility of the findings. Following 
Kahn (2010), IV estimates instrument actual graduation location and timing with region 
level unemployment rates in the location where a worker lived at age 14, and at the 
modal graduation age for their education stream. This approach is akin to instrumenting 
actual graduation with the graduation path an individual would have followed if they had 
not moved location or delayed their program completion.  
These instruments provide a credible source of exogenous variation in labour market 
entry conditions.  At age 14 it is likely that individuals are living in the family household, 
yet it is unlikely that their decisions affected the household location.  The economic 
conditions at the modal age of graduation are also not within the realm of control of an 
individual.  Following Kahn (2010) experience is removed from the specification, 
because experience is also endogenous if workers delay (or accelerate) their education.  
After controlling for endogeneity bias, the estimated effects of entry conditions change 
little relative to the OLS estimates. Table 4 presents causal estimates.  One percentage 
point increase in the regional unemployment rate would lead to a 1.5% increase in the 
probability of one’s overeducation within his/her occupation.  With regards to industry, 
the impact is slightly higher at 1.8% respectively.   Similar IV and OLS effects are 
reasonable given the low incidence of geographic relocation observed in the data.  The 
apparent delay in graduation among groups of workers may simply reflect the education 
program duration. 
The instruments turn out to be appropriate.  The panels below the main results in Table 4 
show that the instruments are highly significant in the first stage.  Coefficients are also 
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large and significant indicating that the instruments correlate highly with the endogenous 
variables.  Indeed it is reasonable that the most common graduation date and location for 
an individual is highly correlated with his or her actual graduation date and location. F-
tests (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) suggest that the null hypothesis of weak instruments is 
rejected at the 1% level in all cases.  
The IV estimates show that the effects of schooling type and age are similar with the 
initial specification and, in addition, the coefficient for the married dummy variable is 
now negative and significant.  The dummy variable indicating a region switch since 
graduation becomes significant.  Those who re-locate appear to be more likely to be 
overqualified in their job.  Conditional on the macroeconomic effects, which are captured 
by the instrument, the coefficient for region switch is likely to capture those who move 
for reasons such as the career of a spouse or a better wage or working conditions.  
Workers entering a new region may have less developed professional networks and might 
be expected to start lower on the career ladder.   
4.4 Scarring Effects  
The costs of overeducation for workers may depend on how long workers remain 
“trapped” in jobs for which they are overqualified.  The career path of young workers is 
often characterised by significant job mobility (Topel and Ward 1992). Job-to-job 
transitions provide important sources of wage growth through occupational upgrading 
(Devereux, 2002). Temporary overeducation, as part of a career path that is optimal over 
the life cycle, might not be viewed as a negative situation. Frei and Sousa-Poza (2012), 
for example, find that half of overqualified Swiss workers find a suitable match within 
one year. Evidence that job match quality is procyclical also suggests that overeducated 
workers might move to better matches when conditions improve (Bowlus 1995; Carillo-
Tudella and Visschers, 2013; Devereux, 2000; 2004; Moscarini and Vella, 2008).  Still 
other findings suggest that Flemish (Baert et al., 2013), and Norwegian (Liu et al., 2012) 
workers may get “trapped” in poor matches.  
This section presents estimates showing that scarring effect of labour market entry 
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conditions on job match quality lasts up to 12 years after graduation.   
The equation (3) below builds on the baseline specification: 
𝑂𝐸!"# = 𝛼 + 𝑋!"#! 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑈!"!! + 𝑍′!"#𝜋 + (𝑈!"!! ∗ 𝑍!"#)′  𝜌 + 𝛿! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!"#       (3) 
The vector Z, which is comprised of dummy variables for the year of graduation, and 3-
year groups for years thereafter, is included along with its interaction with initial 
conditions.  These variables are in lieu of the continuous measures of experience.  The 
dummy variables continue to allow for non-linear effects related to experience while the 
interaction terms allow the effect of entry conditions to vary across the experience 
dimension.  
Table 5 presents the marginal effect of U on OE, evaluated at the year of graduation and 
three year intervals thereafter.  The top panel includes graduation from all types of 
education. Estimates for the probability of overeducation by occupation suggest that 
labour market entry conditions have persistent effects.  The marginal effects are 
significant and positive up to 9 years after graduation.  This 9 year scarring effect is 
similar in duration to the wage penalty scarring effects reported in Oreopoulos et al. 
(2012).   The effects are somewhat less persistent by industry, lasting instead for 6 years.  
The continuous measures capturing the linear distance between actual and required 
education suggest slightly longer persistence.  This result means that some important 
variation in overeducation occurs late in the career even if this variation is insufficient to 
meet the threshold of the binary measures.   
Because estimates by education type in Section 4.2 suggest that the effect is strongest 
among university graduates, the bottom panel of Table 5 presents marginal effects for 
university graduates only.  These estimates suggest that the scarring effects of graduation 
in bad times persist until the end of the sample, at which point some workers had a labour 
market experience for 18 years after graduation.  Plots of these marginal effects are 
presented in the Appendix Figures A3 and A4. 
Several of the measures are insignificant or negative during the year of graduation.  This 
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may reflect the fact that those workers who end up in overeducated jobs, select into these 
work arrangements after an initial period of unsuccessful job search for more suitable 
jobs.  It is also interesting to note that in the horizontal measure, the probability of 
employment in the occupation for which one is trained is significant and negative in the 
year of graduation only.  This suggests that, while there is an effect on horizontal 
mismatch, this effect is temporary.  If workers accept jobs outside their field as a stopgap 
measure, there may be little need to address this type of mismatch with active labour 
market policy.  
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper examines the role of macroeconomic conditions at the time of graduation, or 
first labour market entry, on the mismatch of workers throughout their careers. The 
mismatch is approximated with measures of overeducation by industry and occupation 
that compare the education attainment of workers to the median within their occupation.  
Using an IV estimation to control for the potentially endogenous timing of graduation the 
paper shows that increases in region level unemployment rates at graduation affect the 
future probability of overeducation and hence job mismatch. 
The findings in this paper suggest that the costs of recessions may extend to the future 
career of the affected workers.  Whereas there is a focus among policymakers on 
unemployment statistics, unfavorable labour market conditions are also costly for those 
who do find work.  Because of the robust finding in the literature that overeducated 
workers suffer wage penalties, the results in this paper imply that overeducation is one 
important reason for why labour market entry during a recession can lead to wage 
penalties. 
This paper also suggests that scarring effects are persistent.  Estimates of the probability 
of overeducation are not restricted to early career workers.  In fact, the sizeable impacts 
documented in this paper come from a sample that, on average, displays mid-career 
characteristics in terms of age and labour market experience.   Furthermore, the marginal 
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effects of initial labour market conditions may last up to 12 years after graduation.  The 
duration of scarring effects suggested by these overeducation estimates is consistent with 
the duration of scarring effects on wages in the literature.  This suggests that 
overeducation may help to explain why workers graduating in a recession earn lower 
wages for several years after they enter the labour market. 
Therefore the results in this paper suggest that time does not cure all evils.  Although 
workers may be able to climb the ladder, switching to better jobs as times improve many 
workers cannot overcome the initial scarring effect.  Some workers may choose to remain 
mismatched after the recession if they have developed specific human capital that might 
be lost in transition to the “right” job.  However, there may be scope for training and job-
search assistance programs following recession periods to assist those who are better 
served by returning to occupations or industries where their education is fully utilized.  
These policies may benefit some more experienced workers as well as recent graduates. 
This study finds scant evidence that horizontal mismatch responds to initial labour market 
conditions.  Therefore, policy to improve job matching may be more effective if it is 
directed at workers with vertical mismatch.  It appears that overeducation, that is an 
excess level of schooling, rather than mismatch across fields of study, is more likely to 
come about because of economic downturns.  It is also more likely to have significant 
and lasting effects. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs 
        
Share Male 0.492 0.5 584252 
Age in Years 39.215 21.929 581224 
Share German Citizens 0.862 0.345 584254 
Share Married 0.613 0.487 402660 
        
Years of Ed. 11.837 2.64 383676 
Grad: University 0.019 0.135 584286 
Grad: Tertiary 0.01 0.1 584286 
Grad: Apprentice 0.042 0.202 584286 
        
Share working in Occ Trained For 0.627 0.484 197662 
Actual-Median (OCC) 0.150 1.941 208387 
Actual-Median (IND) 0.400 2.531 212921 
Overeducated (OCC) 0.184 0.387 212921 
Overeducated (IND) 0.086 0.280 212921 
        
Years of FT Experience 18.964 13.404 350358 
Share in First Job 0.017 0.13 230933 
Years of Job Tenure 10.129 9.949 229789 
        
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.128 0.335 498101 
Bavaria 0.14 0.347 498101 
Berlin 0.038 0.191 498101 
Brandenburg 0.042 0.201 498101 
Bremen 0.007 0.082 498101 
Hamburg 0.013 0.112 498101 
Hesse 0.07 0.255 498101 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.025 0.157 498101 
Lower Saxony 0.087 0.282 498101 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.204 0.403 498101 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.05 0.218 498101 
Saarland 0.008 0.092 498101 
Saxony 0.073 0.26 498101 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.043 0.204 498101 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.028 0.164 498101 
Thuringia 0.044 0.205 498101 
Region Switch 0.008 0.089 469937 
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Figure 1:  Entry conditions and the probability of overeducation 
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Table 2: OLS Impacts of Regional Unemployment rate at Graduation from highest education obtained on various Mismatch
Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pr(OE) Pr(OE) Distance Distance Factor Pr(Work in the
Median Median Median Median From Med Occ was
OCC IND OCC IND Measures Trained For)
Reg. Grad Urate 0.011** 0.011** 0.027 0.064*** 0.027** -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.004)
University -0.015 0.457*** 0.926*** 3.066*** 0.873*** 0.292***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.144) (0.169) (0.054) (0.068)
Tertiary -0.005 0.133* 0.393** 0.569*** 0.258** 0.301***
(0.043) (0.064) (0.184) (0.179) (0.092) (0.066)
Apprentice 0.008 0.031 0.417** 0.242 0.140* 0.152**
(0.045) (0.037) (0.171) (0.143) (0.072) (0.054)
Age 0.091*** 0.049** 0.396*** 0.428*** 0.201*** -0.034
(0.012) (0.018) (0.102) (0.093) (0.042) (0.024)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.005** -0.002** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Experience -0.028*** -0.012* -0.145*** -0.107*** -0.059*** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016) (0.007)
Experience2 0.001** -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Married -0.030 -0.029 -0.300** -0.254* -0.105** -0.029
(0.020) (0.020) (0.107) (0.125) (0.042) (0.032)
Male -0.013 0.039 0.030 0.189* 0.060 -0.037*
(0.024) (0.043) (0.098) (0.099) (0.070) (0.020)
German 0.068 0.036 0.142 0.268 0.144 0.090***
(0.052) (0.039) (0.270) (0.286) (0.125) (0.024)
Region Bland 0.061 0.024 0.267 0.254** 0.131** 0.024
(0.038) (0.020) (0.155) (0.087) (0.056) (0.033)
Constant -1.650*** -1.098*** -7.437*** -9.150*** -4.345*** 1.071**
(0.192) (0.299) (1.322) (1.316) (0.606) (0.365)
WBoot p-values
B. Grad Urate 0.058 0.100 0.261 0.076 0.087 0.935
Observations 12,872 13,199 12,872 13,199 12,641 12,685
R-squared 0.087 0.354 0.151 0.469 0.340 0.062
Source: GSOEP 1994-2012. Regional unemployment rates exclude self-employed. Education levels: UNI-university, TERT-technical schooling
such as medical or teaching or other vocational schooling, APR- Apprenticeship. Estimates include dummies for Region of graduation. Region
Switch is a dummy to indicate those who reside in di↵erent region relative to graduation date. Factor 1 includes all median based measures. Reg.
Grad Urate pools the e↵ects of graduation timing across all types of schooling using an individual’s highest achieved education. Standard errors
in parentheses clustered on region of graduation. Estimates weighted with enumeration weights. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values at the region
level impose the null hypothesis using 999 repetitions.
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Table 3: OLS Impacts of Regional Unemployment rate at Graduation from specific level of education obtained on various
Mismatch Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pr(OE) Pr(OE) Distance Distance Factor Pr(In Occ
Median Median Median Median From Med Trained
OCC IND OCC IND Measures For)
Reg. Grad Urate (UNI) 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.037* 0.091*** 0.039*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.005)
Reg. Grad Urate (TERT) 0.011** 0.008 0.026 0.056 0.023 0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.021) (0.032) (0.014) (0.005)
Reg. Grad Urate (APR) 0.008** 0.006 0.024 0.035* 0.017* -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.017) (0.009) (0.004)
University -0.048 0.412*** 0.868*** 2.835*** 0.784*** 0.288***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.146) (0.135) (0.057) (0.068)
Tertiary 0.010 0.165 0.441* 0.653** 0.306* 0.297***
(0.053) (0.112) (0.243) (0.255) (0.157) (0.086)
Apprentice 0.044 0.080** 0.476** 0.507** 0.237** 0.196***
(0.051) (0.032) (0.193) (0.219) (0.085) (0.053)
Age 0.087*** 0.043** 0.389*** 0.399*** 0.189*** -0.034
(0.013) (0.018) (0.102) (0.098) (0.043) (0.023)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.004** -0.002** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Experience -0.027*** -0.012 -0.144*** -0.104** -0.058*** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.031) (0.037) (0.016) (0.007)
Experience2 0.001* -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Married -0.029 -0.028 -0.298** -0.247* -0.102** -0.029
(0.020) (0.021) (0.106) (0.127) (0.043) (0.032)
Male -0.012 0.041 0.033 0.199* 0.063 -0.035*
(0.024) (0.042) (0.099) (0.099) (0.070) (0.020)
German 0.067 0.035 0.141 0.261 0.141 0.090***
(0.053) (0.042) (0.273) (0.291) (0.128) (0.023)
Region Switch 0.061 0.023 0.267 0.250*** 0.131** 0.024
(0.039) (0.020) (0.155) (0.083) (0.057) (0.033)
Constant -1.591*** -0.993*** -7.352*** -8.606*** -4.226*** 1.062***
(0.195) (0.298) (1.313) (1.334) (0.607) (0.359)
WBoot p-values
Reg. Grad Urate (UNI) 0.066 0.054 0.139 0.013 0.039 0.841
Reg. Grad Urate (TERT) 0.128 0.306 0.286 0.158 0.023 0.847
Reg. Grad Urate (APR) 0.036 0.219 0.317 0.090 0.017 0.320
Observations 12,872 13,199 12,872 13,199 12,641 12,685
R-squared 0.089 0.356 0.152 0.471 0.342 0.063
Source: GSOEP 1994-2012. Regional unemployment rates exclude self-employed. Education levels: UNI-university, TERT-technical schooling
such as medical or teaching or other vocational schooling, APR- Apprenticeship. Estimates include dummies for Region of graduation. Region
Switch is a dummy to indicate those who reside in di↵erent region relative to graduation date. Factor 1 includes all median based measures. Reg.
Grad Urate (xxx) shows the e↵ects of graduation timing for each type of schooling separately, where individuals are assigned according to their
highest achieved education. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on region of graduation. Estimates weighted with enumeration weights.
Wild cluster bootstrap p-values at the region level impose the null hypothesis using 999 repetitions.
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Table 4: IV Impacts of Regional Unemployment Rate at Graduation from specific level of education obtained on various
Mismatch Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pr(OE) Pr(OE) Distance Distance Factor Pr(In Occ
Median Median Median Median From Med Trained
OCC IND OCC IND Measures For)
Reg. Grad Urate (UNI) 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.040*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.004)
Reg. Grad Urate (TERT) 0.008** 0.006 0.017 0.048** 0.018* 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.024) (0.010) (0.005)
Reg. Grad Urate (APR) 0.008** 0.006 0.023 0.026 0.015* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.016) (0.008) (0.004)
University -0.024 0.404*** 0.918*** 2.862*** 0.794*** 0.373***
(0.035) (0.026) (0.145) (0.158) (0.070) (0.062)
Tertiary 0.035 0.145* 0.587*** 0.560*** 0.282*** 0.405***
(0.048) (0.075) (0.187) (0.166) (0.104) (0.079)
Apprentice 0.018 0.025 0.427*** 0.374*** 0.148*** 0.325***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.075) (0.118) (0.048) (0.043)
Age 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.418*** 0.499*** 0.203*** 0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.041) (0.048) (0.022) (0.011)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.046** -0.037* -0.404*** -0.322*** -0.143*** -0.022
(0.019) (0.020) (0.092) (0.107) (0.038) (0.030)
Male -0.017 0.024 -0.004 0.106 0.028 -0.026
(0.018) (0.031) (0.074) (0.084) (0.051) (0.021)
German 0.060 0.028 0.124 0.201 0.114 0.095***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.206) (0.226) (0.093) (0.028)
Region Switch 0.073** 0.028* 0.299* 0.295*** 0.151*** 0.035
(0.031) (0.015) (0.167) (0.079) (0.056) (0.031)
First Stage - Uni
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (UNI) 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.944*** 0.945***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (TERT) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (APR) -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
FAP 19397.71*** 88595.87*** 19397.71*** 88595.87*** 18906.51*** 16578.87***
First Stage - Tert
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (UNI) -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (TERT) 0.972*** 0.973*** 0.972*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.974***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (APR) -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
FAP 19112.45*** 7661.33*** 19112.45*** 7661.33*** 19374.47*** 33503.15***
First Stage - Apr
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (UNI) -0.013*** -0.012** -0.013*** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.0034) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Reg. Grad Urate14 (TERT) -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Reg. Grad Urate 14 (APR) 0.971*** 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.965***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
FAP 71101.74*** 51661.41*** 71101.74*** 51661.41*** 74154.60*** 35495.69***
Observations 15,960 16,276 15,960 16,276 15,614 13,146
R-squared 0.084 0.366 0.170 0.491 0.344 0.063
Source: GSOEP 1994-2012. Regional graduation unemployment rates exclude self-employed. Education levels: UNI-university, TERT-technical
schooling such as medical or teaching or other vocational schooling, APR- Apprenticeship. Estimates include dummies for graduation of
graduation. Region Switch is a dummy to indicate those who reside in di↵erent region relative to graduation date. Factor 1 includes all median
based measures, Factor 2 includes median measures and the ”working in occupation trained for”. Reg. Grad Urate (XXX) shows the e↵ects of
graduation timing for each types of schooling using an individual’s highest achieved education. Each potentially endogenous graduation rate Reg.
Grad Urate (XXX) is instrumented with the unemployment rate in the region where an individual resided at age 14 at the time when an
individual ”should have graduated” following Kahn (2010). Standard errors in parentheses clustered on region of graduation. Estimates weighted
with enumeration weights.
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Table 5: The Marginal E↵ect of Labour Market Entry Conditions on Overeducation by Grouped Years Since Graduation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years Pr(OE) Pr(OE) Distance Distance Factor Pr(In Occ
Since Median Median Median Median From Med Trained
Graduation OCC IND OCC IND Measures For)
All Schooling Types
0 0.010** 0.003 0.012 0.020 0.010 -0.018*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.009)
1-3 0.009** 0.011** 0.022 0.071*** 0.023** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.005)
4-6 0.014** 0.012** 0.035 0.071*** 0.032*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.019) (0.009) (0.005)
5-9 0.014* 0.007 0.054** 0.075** 0.031* -0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.027) (0.029) (0.016) (0.005)
10-12 0.012 0.010 0.063 0.063* 0.030 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.039) (0.035) (0.018) (0.006)
13-15 0.004 0.011 0.051 0.031 0.019 0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.048) (0.058) (0.023) (0.010)
16-18 0.024 0.008 0.119 0.063 0.041 -0.012
(0.016) (0.010) (0.091) (0.067) (0.034) (0.021)
University Only
0 0.006 -0.017** -0.020 -0.064* -0.022 -0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.033) (0.013) (0.006)
1-3 0.002 0.007** -0.022 0.033 0.007 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.028) (0.008) (0.006)
4-6 0.010 0.020*** 0.008 0.076** 0.032*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.003) (0.026) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005)
5-9 0.016* 0.027*** 0.044 0.118*** 0.052*** 0.012*
(0.009) (0.005) (0.041) (0.032) (0.012) (0.006)
10-12 0.018* 0.025*** 0.050 0.105 ** 0.052** 0.014**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.046) (0.045) (0.018) (0.006)
13-15 0.033* 0.032** 0.121* 0.194** 0.088*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.012) (0.063) (0.070) (0.028) (0.014)
16-18 0.030 0.034* 0.147 0.271* 0.101* -0.012
(0.022) (0.019) (0.123) (0.132) (0.053) (0.030)
Source: GSOEP 1994-2012. Marginal e↵ects from OLS regressions including dummies for grouped years since graduation, the regional unemployment
rate at graduation and their interactions. Regional unemployment rates exclude self-employed. Other control variables include education levels:
UNI-university, TERT-technical schooling such as medical or teaching or other vocational schooling, APR- Apprenticeship, dummies for region of
graduation, year dummies, dummies for German nationality, gender and marital status, a dummy to indicate those who reside in di↵erent region
relative to graduation date, and age in years and its quadratic. and. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on region of graduation. Estimates
weighted with enumeration weights. Wild cluster bootstrap p-values at the region level impose the null hypothesis using 999 repetitions.
1
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                  Appendix 
 
Table A1: Factor loading matrix 
  Factor1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Overeducated (OCC) 0.7068 0.0291 0.4147 
Actual-Required Education (OCC) 0.7896 0.2475 0.3153 
Overeducated (IND) 0.7927 -0.2557 0.3062 
Actual-Required Education (IND) 0.8372 -0.237 0.2429 
Factor loadings from the factor analysis procedure used to generate the composite measure of overeducation.  The first factor appears 
to capture overeducation (the difference between actual and required education) while the second factor appears to differentiate 
occupation from industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2:  T-test for difference of mean Pr(OE) Occupation by number of observations per 
Occupation/Year 
 <10 ≥ 10 Difference 
Mean 0.145 0.146 -0.001 
SE (0.041) (0.001) (0.040) 
N 76 207009  
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Figure A1:  Distribution of cell-sizes used to Generate Industry Overeducation Measure 
 
 
 Figure A2:  Distribution of cell-sizes used to Generate Occupation Overeducation Measure 
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Figure A3: The effect of Labour Market Entry Conditions on Overeducation by Years 
Since Graduation: All Graduates 
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Figure A4: The effect of Labour Market Entry Conditions on Overeducation by Years 
Since Graduation: University Graduates 
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